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ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
~ I. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 58-37-2(1)(g) YIELDS ABSURD RESULTS, 
HAS UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES, AND REQUIRES THIS COURT TO 
APPLY AN INTERPRETATION THAT AVOIDS THE ABSURD AND 
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF THE STATUTE. 
~ The City correctly points out that under standard rules of statutory construction 
this Court will attempt to give effect to legislative intent by first looking to the plain and 
ordinary language of a statute. Brief for Appellee City of St. George, 21-25 (hereinafter 
"BACSG")(citing Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P'ship, 2011 UT 50, 267 P.3d 863). 
The City then proceeds to review U.C.A. § 58-37-2(1 )(g) and concludes the language is 
unambiguous and clear and therefore "there is one correct way to interpret the statute." 
Id. The City goes further by contending this Court should tum a blind eye to the absurd 
~ results and constitutional concerns created by a disjunctive reading of the statute purely 
on the claim the statute is clear and unambiguous. Id. at 25-33. However, in taking this 
approach, the City completely ignores previous rulings relating to impact absurd results 
have on the interpretation of a statute and concerns with constitutionality. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that " [ w ]here a statute's plain language creates 
vP an absurd, unreasonable, or inoperable result, we assume the legislature did not intend 
that result." State v. J.M.S., 2011 UT 75, <Jl27, 280 P.3d 410. The Utah Supreme Court 
continued in stating, "[i]n applying this canon of construction, we have recognized the 
delicate line between 'refraining from blind obedience to the letter of the law that leads to 
patently absurd ends and avoiding improper usurpation of legislative power through 
judicial second guessing of the wisdom of a legislative act." Id. The control imposed by 
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the court to help navigate that "delicate line" is by limited the application of this rule to 
those situations where "a plain language interpretation is so absurd that the 'legislature 
could not have possibly intended' it. 11 Id. 
J.M.S. does not stand alone in the Utah Supreme Court's caution towards a blind 
application of the plain language of a statute. In LP/ Servs. v. McGee, the Utah Supreme 
Court provided that " [ w ]hen the plain meaning of the statute can be discerned from its 
language, no other interpretive tools are needed. However, 'a court should not follow the 
literal language of a statute if its plain meaning works an absurd result."' 2009 UT 41, 
<J[l 1, 215 P.3d 135. 
Under this approach to statutory interpretation and construction the analysis does 
not end merely because the language is purportedly clear and unambiguous. The district 
court acknowledged as much in its opinion where it explained that the 11absurdity 
doctrine ... has nothing to do with resolving ambiguities, but which is applied 'to reform 
unambiguous statutory language where applying the plain language leads to results so 
overwhelmingly absurd no rational legislator could have intended them." R. at 638 n.6 
(citing Utley v. Mill Man Steel, Inc., 2015 UT 75, <J[46, 357 P.3d 992). The question of 
whether that language results in absurd results remains and even prevails in the face of 
otherwise clear and plain language. To that end, the City is in error to contend that "the 
absurd results ... canons do not apply in the absence of ambiguity. As can be seen from the 
aforementioned language, where that language renders patently absurd results this Court 
is not only within its prerogative to turn from the purported clear and unambiguous 
language but is required to do so. 
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It should be noted at this point that to date no one has suggested that a disjunctive 
\@ reading does not in fact create the very absurd results complained of. They cannot, for a 
disjunctive reading creates the legal and factual reality of criminalizing a wide swath of 
innocent and common items, and the federal cases relied upon by Mike's Smoke Shop 
provide ample evidence of this fact. Instead, the City and to some extent the district court, 
attempt to side-step this issue by asserting that people are not being prosecuted for any of 
the unintended substances caught up in the disjunctive reading. BACSG at 33-34 and R. 
at 638 n.6. 
For example, the City attempts to make the enforcement of the absurd results 
appear absurd in and of itself when it asks this Court to "[i]magine a drug task force 
raiding the comer market and bagging energy drinks and Doritos as evidence while 
hauling the unsuspecting shopkeeper down to the station to book on drug charges." 
BACSG at 33. While Mike's agrees that the likelihood of a drug task force taking down 
~ the wily suppliers of Doritos is low; Mike's contends the possibility of such an operation 
aimed at energy drinks is very much in the realm of possibility given the fact that they 
have been directly linked to deaths by the FDA, have caused a rash of health issues 
requiring emergency care, and target youth--all factors which contributed to spice being 
targeted. See R. at 269-296. 
In 2011 it was reported that energy drink popularity was soaring and "that surge 
has also been seen in visits to hospital rooms due to related health issues such as heart 
arrhythmias, hypertension, and dehydration." R. at 291. Indeed, in a study relied upon in 
that article, ER visits resulting from energy drink consumption between 2005 and 2009 
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peaked at 16,000 in 2008. Id. Young people between the ages of 18 and 25 were 
disproportionately represented. Id. at 291-92. What is more, when energy drinks are 
combined with alcohol or drugs "the risk of significant, even life-threatening events 
increases." Id. 
Those concerns were echoed by the FDA in a 2013 report which indicated "[t]he 
U.S. energy drink industry has grown rapidly since the drinks were first introduced. R. at 
269. This is in part thanks to "aggressive marketing" which has made energy drinks 
"particularly popular among adolescents." Id. The FDA is more explicit in its health 
impacts analysis explicitly citing Monster Energy drinks as "implicated in the deaths of 
five individuals" and 5-Hour Energy drinks as having "possible involvement in another 
thirteen deaths. Id. at 271. The health consequences are even more serious when the 
energy drinks are mixed with alcohol, yet national data indicates that some "26% of high 
school seniors consumed an alcoholic beverage containing caffeine during the past year. 11 
Id. at 273. 
The articles relating to energy drinks and their health impacts are startling. 
Nevertheless, these drinks remain widely available to all ages and from virtually any 
store. Accordingly, while the City may find the image of a drug task force taking down a 
purveyor of energy drinks far-fetched, or perhaps even humorous, Mike's does not share 
in the sentiment. The simple fact is, given the health consequences of the drinks, they 
probably should be regulated. An enterprising city or prosecutor awakening to that fact 
may very well seek enforcement through the most applicable statute currently available--




What is more, is that substances not normally intended to be caught up in the 
@ controlled substances statutes are in fact now covered, including tobacco and alcohol. 
I~ 
\//!JI 
Those substances have well documented severe health consequences to the public at 
large. Is it really so far out of the realm of possibility that providers of these substances 
may be targeted by a city or prosecutor seeking to stem those health consequences in 
their respective jurisdiction? When one considers this case arises from spice, a substance 
which pales in comparison to the impacts of tobacco and alcohol, one can readily see how 
the targeting of tobacco and/or alcohol is not far-fetched. 
However, to focus on whether prosecution is likely for the purveyors of energy 
drinks or MSG laced Doritos is a red herring. The doctrine of absurdity does not ask 
whether the absurd results are actual prosecution for otherwise innocent activities, but 
rather whether the impact is the criminalization of said activities. In other words, even if 
not prosecuted, does an disjunctive reading of U.C.A. § 58-37-2(l)(g) factually render 
Q> every day Utahns into felons? It does. 
Put another way, should we consider a dealer of cocaine who is never caught or 
prosecuted as not being a felon routinely engaged in criminal activity? Does the behavior 
only become criminal upon prosecution? Obviously not. While a conviction may be 
necessary for the impacts of a felony to attach to the individual, the lack of prosecution 
does not remove the illegality of the act(s) 1• 
1 While understanding that the interplay between religion and the law is sensitive, one 
@ cannot ignore the reality that Utah is made up of a substantial number of members of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. A religion which espouses as a core belief 
"in being subject to kings, presidents, rulers, and magistrates, in obeying, honoring, and 
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It is perhaps for this reason that courts have long held that "no one may be 
required at peril of life, liberty, of property to speculate as to the meaning of penal 
statutes." Lanzetta v. State of N.J., 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939). While this language is 
typically applied to vagueness issues relating to statutes, the principle is valid in the 
present context of absurdities. This is because there is no vagueness as to whether a 
disjunctive reading criminalizes a host of mundane and innocent substances as by its 
clear language it does. Rather, the issue is whether the public at large should bear the risk 
that their innocent activities, now criminalized, may one day be prosecuted. It is absurd 
that a clerk selling 5-Hour energy should daily run the risk of prosecution for a felony 
offense--even if that clerk, after considerable interruption to his life, considerable 
expense on minimal funds, and extreme stress can manage to defeat the charges on an 
unconstitutional as applied challenge, for the clerk should never have born the burden to 
begin with. 
The salient point is this, the City, the district court, and a host of federal courts, 
have all recognized that a disjunctive reading factually and legally makes mundane and 
otherwise innocent products a controlled substance analog. In turn, a disjunctive reading 
will make a vast portion of the Utah population felons-in-fact. The City asks this Court to 
sustammg the law. 11 12th Article of Faith. https://www .lds.org/scriptures/pgp/a-of-
f/1.11 ?lang=eng (emphasis added). This tenant of faith is not tied to prosecutions or raids 
by task forces but rather by a personal accountability to God. In this sense, the 
criminalization of everyday common items is objectionable to a good proportion of the 
citizens of the State as it invites and perhaps even necessitates the violation of the law in 
contravention to a core religious belief. It is absurd to think that the legislature, itself 
likely made up of numerous practicing LOS members, intended a result that would be so 
offensive to the practices and beliefs of the dominate religion in the State. 
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blindly permit this consequence to remain under the guise that it is the will of the 
~ legislature. Such is not the case. The results are so absurd, so far reaching, and so severe, 
the legislature could not have possibly intended it. As a result, this Court should not 
afford "blind obedience to the letter of the law" nor 11follow the literal language" of the 
statute given the patently and undeniable absurd consequences such a reading would 
render. A conjunctive reading is necessary to both permit prosecutions of analogs to 
continue while avoiding the absurdity that follows from a disjunctive interpretation. 
II. THE CITY NEVER MADE ANY FACTUAL FINDINGS THAT MIKE'S 
OR ITS EMPLOYEES EVER REPRESENTED OR INTENDED XLR-11 TO 
HAVE A SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR PHARMOCOLOGICAL EFFECT TO 
AM-694 AND NO ELEMENT OF SCIENTER IS REQUIRED OR MET. 
The City contends that "[t]here was substantial evidence to show Mike's 
@ knowingly and intentionally possessed a controlled substance with the intent to 
distribute ... " BACSG at 34. The City then equates evidence of possession with intent to 
distribute with U.C.A. § 58-37-2(1 )(g)'s requirement that the defendant "represented or 
intended [the substance] to have" a "substantially similar" pharmacological effect as a 
controlled substance (in this case AM-694). The City does so by pointing to a single non-
~ binding, non-majority, statement of Justice Roberts wherein he states "a person's lack of 
knowledge regarding the legal element can be a defense. 11 BACSG at 35 (citing 
McFadden v. U.S., 135 S. Ct. 2298, 2308 (2015)(Roberts, C.J., concurring)).2 The City 
2 It should also be noted here that the City points out the U.S. Supreme Court did not 
address the issue of whether the federal analog law is properly read in the conjunctive or 
disjunctive and therefore the matter "remains unresolved." BACSG at 35 n.14. While the 
U.S. Supreme Court did not address the issue, that does not mean the matter is 
unresolved. As indicated in the Appellant's Opening Brief, there has been absolute 
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then makes a final step by taking Justice Robert's statement and concluding that means 
the analog law contains a scienter requirement (i.e. the knowledge and intent not just of 
the act, but that the act is illegal). Id. However, this runs absolutely contrary to Utah law 
and in particular Utah law relating specifically to spice and the analog law. 
In State v. Arghittu, this Court was asked to consider a number of issues relating to 
the spice chemical AM-2201 as a controlled substance analog of another spice chemical, 
JWH-018. 2015 UT App. 22, 'Il27, 343 P.3d 709. One such issue was whether the 
defendant's lack of knowledge was to the illegality of AM-2201 as a controlled substance 
analog was a defense. This Court held: 
Arghittu may have believed that AM-2201 was not illegal because it was 
not specifically listed in section 58-37-4.2. However, in light of AM-2201 's 
potential to qualify as a controlled substance analog under section 58-37-2, 
such a belief would have constituted a mistake of law, which in most 
circumstances is no bar to criminal liability. See State v. Steele, 2010 UT 
App 185, 'Il 30, 236 P.3d 161 ("'[A] good faith or mistaken belief that one's 
conduct is legal does not relieve a person of criminal liability for engaging 
in proscribed conduct."' (quoting 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law§ 
137 (2008))). 
Id. 
Based on the decision in Arghittu, a person being prosecuted for possessing with 
intent to distribute a controlled substance analog cannot raise the defense of ignorance as 
to the illegality of the substance. Accordingly, so long as the defendant knowingly and 
intentionally possessed the substance, even if truly believing the substance to be legal, he 
uniformity in the federal courts interpreting the statute in the conjunctive. This uniformity 
stretches across multiple circuits and districts. To suggest the matter is unresolved is to 
suggest there is still some ongoing debate. There is none. Hence the Governments 
assumption in McFadden that the statute was properly read in the conjunctive. 
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is guilty of the offense. This completely removes the scienter component the City asserts 
@ saves U.C.A. § 58-37-2(1)(g) as a disjunctive statute. 
The City's error as to scienter requirement is echoed in its claims that it found 
Mike's represented or intended XLR-11 to have a substantially similar pharmacological 
I.;} 
effect as AM-694. There is no such finding. 
Indeed, the City lists a series of facts it claims are supported by substantial 
evidence and which it purports proves Mike's represented and/or intended XLR-11 to be 
substantially similar to the pharmacological effects of AM-694. BACSG at 39-40. In 
addition to those facts are the Findings the City made as detailed in its Findings of Facts, 
Conclusions and Order. R. at 42-49. Finally, the City also has a series of police reports 
detailing conversations with Mike's employees concerning the purchase and sell of spice 
containing XLR-11. R. at 59-173. 
Nowhere in those facts and reports does any employee claim XLR-11 would 
~ create a substantially similar pharmacological effect on a person as AM-694. Nowhere in 
those facts and reports does any employee assert or acknowledge that he or she intended 
XLR-11 to have a substantially similar pharmacological effect as AM-694. Indeed, the 
closest acknowledgement is one employee's assertion that on one occasion he tried spice 
(he does not indicate what chemical(s) were present in the spice nor what the 
pharmacological effects were other than to say it made him sick), and that he knew one or 
more people were ingesting spice (again without any representation as to what chemicals 
were in the spice or what pharmacological effects were being manifested). R. at 71 and 
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108-109. Consequently, the City has no evidence of any kind that Mike's intended or 
represented XLR-11 to have a substantially similar pharmacological effect as AM-694. 
It is important to note here that the comparison is between the alleged analog and 
the specific controlled substance the alleged analog is being compared to. See Arghittu, 
2015 UT App. 22 (comparing the specific similarities between AM-2201 and JWH-018). 
Since the City lacks that evidence and now wants to reverse engineer its decision 
in case it was wrong on its statutory interpretation, the City attempts to shift the focus to 
what it believes is evidence that Mike's intended to possess and distribute spice. Since 
Mike's does not contest the factual findings actually made by the City for purposes of this 
appeal, Mike's will adopt the position that there is substantial evidence it possessed spice 
with the intent to deliver it. In the end, it is of no import. The requirement is clear, the 
defendant must have represented or intended XLR-11 to have a substantially similar 
pharmacological effect as AM-694. Accordingly, for purposes of determining whether 
XLR-11 is an analog it matters not that it was being possessed for later delivery. Rather, 
it matters what the intent or representations were as to pharmacological effect. In that 
respect, the City lacks any factual findings and any evidence from factual findings could 
be derived. 
Consequently, should this Court agree that U.C.A. § 58-37-2(1)(g) must be read in 
the conjunctive, the City's findings will only apply to one of the three prongs where at 




Treating each subpart of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-2(1 )(g) as a stand-alone 
subpart yields absurd results. These results criminalize vast numbers of otherwise 
mundane and innocent products, but more importantly, factually and legally makes felons 
of the substantial portion of Utahns. The City's attempt to hide behind the lack of 
prosecution over the last couple of years does nothing to change the status of everyday 
Utahns as habitual violators of the law. Nor does it remove Utahns from bearing the risk 
of prosecution. The results are absurd to a startling degree. So much so that the 
legislature could not have intended it. 
Under such circumstances, even in the face of clear and unambiguous language to 
~ the contrary, this Court must depart from the literal language and afford the statute an 
interpretation that avoids the absurd results and avoids constitutional concerns. In the 
present case, this Court has the benefit of guidance in federal case law which sets forth 
the manner in which this is to be accomplished--a conjunctive reading. By reading the 
statute in the conjunctive, this Court still gives effect to the legislative intent of 
~ prosecuting analog substances while avoiding the appallingly absurd results that stem 
from a disjunctive reading. 
Additionally, the City's reliance on a scienter requirement is misplaced and does 
not save U.C.A. § 58-37-2(1)(g). Knowledge of the illegality of an analog is no defense. 
The City has never made any actual findings, nor does it possess any evidence that 
could support any findings, that XLR-11 has a substantially similar pharmacological 
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effect as AM-694. Accordingly, when U.C.A. § 58-37-2(1 )(g) is read in the conjunctive, 
the City's revocation cannot stand. 
Finally, while the City wants to focus solely on the case at hand, this Court will set 
a precedent when determining how U.C.A. § 58-37-2(1 )(g) is interpreted. That precedent 
will determine if the statute is conjunctive or disjunctive as to all analog cases. It cannot 
be changed on whim to accommodate one case over another. If it is disjunctive here, it is 
disjunctive as to all analog substances. Therefore, it is wholly appropriate for this Court 
to consider the far reaching and long term ramifications of rendering a disjunctive 
reading to the statute. Under such considerations, a conjunctive reading is more 
appropriate. 
For the foregoing reasons, Mike's respectfully requests this Court find that U.C.A. 
§ 58-37-2(1)(g) be read in the conjunctive and that the City's revocation be reversed. 
DATED this 27th day of June 2016. 
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Ryan L. Holdaway 
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